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Army officers cleared of grave crimes in East Timor 
The announcement in August that the High Court in Jakarta had quashed the sentences of top-rank-
ing Indonesian army officers who were found guilty of grave crimes in East Tim or after the East 
Timorese had voted overwhelmingly for independence has infuriated all those hoping that those who 
caused such widespread havoc and killings would be duly punished for their crimes. The jubilant 
response in Jakarta to this travesty highlights the utter lack of a sense of responsibility in the political 
elite for the crimes perpetrated in East Timor. 
The mayhem which followed the referendum on East 
Timor's future in August 1999 led to a quarter of a million 
people being forcibly moved to West Timor and the death of 
around 1,500 Timorese. Almost the entire infractructure of 
East Timor was destroyed in the process. This was the 
Indonesian army's parting gift to a people whose country 
they had brutally occupied for nearly 25 years. 
Three top-ranking military officers and a police officer 
who were found guilty of these acts of destruction had been 
tried by a special court in Jakarta set up in 2001 to deflect 
international criticism. 
Foremost among the officers found guilty was Major-
General Adam Damiri who was responsible for overall 
control of East Timor in the closing years of the occupation. 
Another found guilty was Colonel Noer Muis. Damiri has 
since been involved in offensive operations in Aceh, while 
Muis is now teaching ethics at the army's staff college. 
The acquittal of Damiri, Muis and two others means that 
not a single Indonesian officer will be punished, while the 
only ones to have their convictions upheld are two East 
Timorese, the former governor of East Timor, Abilio 
Soares, and militia leader Eurico Guterres, whose sentence 
was halved. 
Although the prosecutors could challenge the decision in 
Indonesia's Supreme Court, there are no signs that they 
intend to do so. A UN-appointed prosecutor for serious 
crimes in East Timor, Nicholas Koumjian, said the acquit-
tals showed that Indonesia had failed to demonstrate its 
commitment to uphold human rights and the rule of law. 
'The international community should now act to make sure 
impunity is not allowed to continue.' 
Amnesty International said in a statement: 'The trials and 
appeals in Indonesia have been flawed from the very start. 
The UN must ensure that its commitment to bring the 
perpetrators of human rights abuses to justice is fulfilled.' 
[The Guardian, 7 August 2004] 
Usman Hamid of Kontras, Indonesia's Commission for 
the Disappeared and the Victims of Violence, called this 'a 
terible decision,' saying: 'We should be ashamed.' 
[Financial Times, 7 August 2004] 
The acquittals are seen as a victory for the Indonesian 
army and the political elite whose sense of deep humiliation 
at the 'loss' of East Tim or continues to rankle. 
International tribunal needed 
Following the acquittals, TAPOL has renewed its call for an 
International Tribunal for East Timor to be set up, stressing 
that alternative judicial mechanisms are the only way forward. 
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Pressure for East Timor justice intensifies 
The East Timorese people and international campaigners are continuing their strenuous 
efforts to ensure that those responsible/or crimes against humanity in East Timor are brought 
to justice. In July, 106 individuals, representing a wide cross-section of East Timorese civil 
society, wrote to UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, expressing support for a commission of 
experts to evaluate existing justice processes and recommend future action. This followed simi-
lar initiatives by 78 members of the US Congress and a number of leading international human 
rights organisations. 
East Timorese civil society feels badly let down by the 
failure of the judicial processes in Indonesia and East Tim or 
to meet its needs and demands for justice. The trials in 
Jakarta's ad hoc human rights court were 'in effect show 
trials created entirely to exonerate and cover up crimes 
through a legal process', said the civil society representa-
tives in their letter to Kofi Annan on 19 July 2004. They 
pointed out that several accused who have been convicted 
are still at large in Indonesia and the former head of the 
East Timorese faces 
armed forces and recent Indonesian presidential candidate, 
General (retired.) Wiranto, 'who arguably bears most 
responsibility for the crimes committed', has avoided trial. 
Others still occupy strategic positions in the military. 
Meanwhile the serious crimes process in East Timor has 
only been able to deal with low-level perpetrators living in 
East Timor. A large number of those indicted remain in 
Indonesia beyond the reach of East Timor's courts. One of 
the major reasons for these failures is the absence of pres-
sure on Indonesia from the international community to co-
operate with the serious crimes process, said the civil soci-
ety representatives in their letter. 
The signatories included individuals from organisations 
such as the Commission for Reception, Truth and 
Reconciliation (CAVR), the National Alliance for an 
International Tribunal, which represents 28 NGOs and 
victims' groups, legal aid organisations, community repre-
sentatives, students and lecturers. 
In their letter, they called upon Kofi Annan to establish a 
properly-resourced commission of experts to evaluate the 
Indonesian and East Timorese court processes and recom-
mend future actions, including the possible establishment of 
an international tribunal. 
Congress members seek accountability 
Emphasising the UN's responsi-
bility for justice in their letter to 
Kofi Annan on 1 July 2004, the 78 
' members of the US Congress 
stressed that any judicial mecha-
nism must achieve two objectives. 
It must establish the truth of what 
happened in East Timor and it 
must hold the perpetrators legally 
accountable. They pointed out that 
proposals for an International 
Truth Commission, recently 
suggested in the Security Council 
by the United States, should be 
viewed, at best, as interim steps 
towards achieving accountability. 
In supporting a commission of 
experts, the members of Congress 
said they did not believe it could 
substitute for an international 
tribunal and urged the Commission 
to 'carefully consider recommend-
Photo:Elaine Briere ing an international tribunal ... if it 
finds that current processes have not 
achieved justice'. 
The Congress members expressed concern about the 
Secretary General's recommendation - in his report on the 
UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) made to 
the Security Council on 29 April - that the Serious Crimes 
Unit (SCU) in East Timor should complete its work by May 
2005, saying that 'ending SCU investigations at that point 
could leave an estimated 700 murder victims and thousands 
of victims of rape, torture, and other crimes against human-
ity in 1999 alone without justice'. 
They insisted that the 'continued existence of the ... SCU, 
and its continued focus on investigations, as well as trials 
and appeals' was essential and urged the Secretary General 
to review his recommendation. · 
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Rights groups support initiative 
The heads of a number of prominent human rights and 
justice organisations, including Amnesty International, 
Human Rights Watch and the International Federation for 
East Timor (IFET), had earlier, on 24 June, written a joint 
letter to the Secretary General urging him to appoint a 
commission of experts in the areas of international human-
itarian law, criminal law and transitional justice 'to review 
the status of efforts undertaken in the region and to hold 
individuals accountable for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity committed in East Timor.' 
They pointed to the 'deeply disappointing' efforts of 
Indonesia's ad hoc Tribunal, which they said 'do not appear 
Cemetery on the road to Kelikai 
to demonstrate a genuine effort to punish the perpetrators or 
maintain minimum recognised standards of independence 
and impartiality' and also 'risk perpetuating an incorrect 
historical record'. 
They wrote that 'to be as effective as possible, we urge that 
the Commission be formed immediately' and that it cover 
the work of the Jakarta Tribunal and the UN-established 
Serious Crimes process in East Timor. 
Stressing the urgency of the initiative, they argued that 'if 
the Commission does not convene and report promptly, 
options to address core accountability issues in the region 
will be lost, especially given the Security Council's resolu-
tion, S/RES/1543 (2004), encouraging the Serious Crimes 
Unit to complete investigations by November 2004 and the 
Special Panels to complete trials by May 2005.' 
Gusmao plays a dangerous game 
It is especially important for the international commu-
nity to take the lead in securing accountability for serious 
crimes given the priority of East Timor's leaders to maintain 
good relations with Indonesia. At times this priority has 
tended to undermine attempts to achieve justice, but the two 
objectives of justice and friendly relations are not incom-
I 
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patible. On the contrary Indonesia will be strengthened as 
a nation and relations between the two countries will 
improve in the long term if the issue of military impunity is 
confronted. 
A statement issued by the East Timorese NGO, the 
Judicial System Monitoring Programme (JSMP) accompa-
nying the civil society letter to Kofi Annan lamented the 
lack of support from the East Timorese Government and its 
injudicious 'forgive and forget' attitude, which involves 
embracing Wiranto while low-level East Timor militia 
members are sent to prison. There has recently been 
concern about inappropriate interference by East Timer's 
leaders in the judicial proceedings against General Wiranto. 
On 10 May 2004, an international 
judge at the Special Panel for Serious 
Crimes in East Timor issued an arrest 
warrant for Wiranto. He had been 
indicted on crimes against humanity 
charges in February 2003. However, 
in response to pressure from East 
Timer's leaders, the country's chief 
prosecutor, Longuinhos Monteiro, 
who had previously actively pursued 
warrants against senior Indonesians, 
attempted unsuccessfully to persuade 
the Special Panel to withdraw the 
indictment. Monteiro has since 
refused to request an international 
arrest warrant from Interpol. 
At the end of May, East Timor's 
President, Xanana Gusmao, was 
heavily criticised for meeting Wiranto 
in Bali for 'reconciliation talks'. 
Gusmao was accused of causing 
offence to the victims of military 
violence in Indonesia as well as East 
Timor and of inappropriate interfer-
ence in Indonesia's electoral process. 
__ According to Indonesia's National 
h t El . B . Human Rights Commission (Komnas 
p 0 o: ame riere HAM), as military commander, Wiranto 
was also responsible for killings and 
rights abuses committed by military personnel during the 
Trisakti University incident and Jakarta riots at the time of 
the downfall of former President Suharto in May 1998, and 
during the Semanggi I and II incidents in November 1998 
and September 1999. 
On his return to East Timor, Gusmao was confronted by 
angry demonstrators denouncing his dialogue with Wiranto 
and demanding justice for atrocities committed by the 
Indonesian army. Gusmao was also criticised by 
Indonesian NGOs, including his former lawyer and chair-
man of the Indonesian Legal Aid and Human Rights 
Association (PBHI), Hendardi. 
Gusmao has since courted controversy by signing a letter, 
with Monteiro, proclaiming the innocence and requesting 
the release from prison of former East Timor Governor, 
Abilio Soares [TEMPO Interactive, 21 July 2004]. Soares 
was convicted of crimes against humanity by Jakarta's ad 
hoc human rights court and sentenced. to three years impris-
onment in August 2002. He began his sentence in July 
2004 after the Supreme Court rejected his appeal. * 
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May 1998 atrocity still unresolved 
There have been renewed calls in Indonesia for action to be taken to bring to justice those who 
were responsible for instigating a series of riots in May 1998 which erupted in Jakarta and 
other major Indonesian cities in the final days of the Suharto era. In terms of the number of 
casualties and the damage to tens of thousands of livelihoods, the riots are exceeded only by the 
1965-1966 massacres, the 1984 Tanjung Priok atrocity and the Santa Cruz massacre in East 
Tim or. 
Although numerous atrocities of the Suharto era remain 
unresolved, the May 1998 atrocity has a certain topicality in 
view of the fact that one of the suspects, General Wiranto, 
now retired, has been nominated by GOLKAR for president 
in the election scheduled for 5 July and a possible run-off 
in September. Wiranto was armed forces commander-in-
chief at the time. His running-mate, Solahuddin Wahid, a 
leader oflndonesia's largest Muslim organisation, Nahdatul 
Ulama, shocked the nation when he announced his decision 
to contest the election as Wiranto's running-mate even 
though, shortly beforehand, a human rights commission 
which he chaired had named the general as being responsi-
ble for failing to do anything to halt the riots, making him 
responsible, by omission, for the atrocity. Solahuddin is also 
the brother of Abdurrachman Wahid, who served an ill-
fated term as president oflndonesia for fifteen months, until 
he was forced to resign in favour of Megawati 
Sukamoputri. 
Human Rights Commission findings 
Following investigations into the riots, Indonesia's 
National Human Rights Commission, Komnas-HAM, came 
to the conclusion that there were indications of 'systematic 
gross human rights violations during the events of May 
1998' and recommended that an ad hoc human rights court 
should be convened to try those suspected of responsibility. 
This would be the way forward according to Law 26 of 
2000 on Human Rights Courts. However, such a move 
requires the support of parliament, the DPR, which recently 
declared that the May riots were nothing more than 'ordi-
nary crimes'. 
Komnas-HAM investigations were also severely hampered 
by the refusal of a number of military officers to respond to 
summonses for questioning, as would be required if the 
DPR were to endorse the Commission's proposal for the 
establishment of an ad hoc human rights tribunal. 
Giving voice to the 
Commission's frustrations, its 
chair, Abdul Hakim Garuda 
Nusantara, urged presidential 
and vice-presidential candi-
dates to take careful note of its 
many reports identifying 
grave rights violations in May 
1998, the Semanggi I and II 
incidents in November 1998 
and the September 1999 
mayhem following the pro-
independence vote by the East 
Timorese. He said that if the 
current government did noth-
ing, it would be the job of the 
next government to follow up 
on there investigations. 
The May 1998 riots 
The political situation in 
Indonesia had been in ferment 
since the beginning of 1998. 
Student demonstrations call-
Mayhem in Jatinegara, a busy neighbourhood in Jakarta. Burned and looted shops and ing for the resignation of Suharto 
houses in May 1998 had become daily events in many 
Another former general whose role at the time has come 
under scrutiny is Prabowo Subianto, son-in-law of the 
former president, Suharto. Wiranto and Prabowo were bitter 
rivals in May 1998, when the presidential succession was 
up for grabs. 
cities and towns, and were 
confronted by well-armed units of soldiers and police. The 
1997 financial crisis which had plunged the countries of 
South East Asia into crisis hit the Indonesian economy with 
particular severity, with the result that corporations and 
financial houses close to the regime had cut and run. The 
4 TAPOL Bulletin No. 176, August 2004 
collapse of many industrial 
sectors had hit the urban poor 
very hard, causing a massive 
increase in unemployment. 
Since the end of 1997, a 
number of students had been 
abducted, some of whom 
were later released with grue-
some accounts of what had 
happened to them. As student 
demonstrations throughout 
the country intensified in 
1998, more than a dozen 
students were abducted by 
Kopassus troops; nine were 
later released but four of the 
abducted students have never 
been accounted for. 
Then on 12 May, troops 
opened fire on students of 
Trisakti University, killing 
four demonstrators. The 
commander of Kopassus was 
Lt-General Prabowo 
Subianto. While Prabowo 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
alleged that the abductions were Five-storey electronics shopping mall in Glodok, Chinatown in Jakarta completely 
justified in the interests of burned down. 
national security, this provided 
armed forces commander-in-chief General Wiranto with 
grounds to dismiss Prabowo from the army. This was seen 
at the time as clearing the way for Wiranto to assume power 
when Suharto stepped down. But when Suharto announced 
his resignation a week later, on 21 May, Wiranto did not 
take over, instead leaving it to Suharto's deputy, B.J. 
Habibie, to take the reins of power. Wiranto realised only 
too well that the standing of the armed forces was at an all-
time low. Shrewdness had cautioned him against grabbing 
power, because of the instability that would certainly have 
ensued. He may have since calculated that his caution paid 
off when GOLKAR's central council voted by a sizeable 
majority to nominate him for president in the 2004 presi-
dential election. 
A grave human catastrophe .. 
The riots which erupted in Jakarta and several other c1t1es 
on 13 May 1998 were preceded by the shooting dead of four 
Trisakti University students on 12 May. The students had 
been taking part in a peaceful demonstration calling on 
Suharto to step down and were returning to their campus 
when troops, situated on a flyover, opened fire on the · 
students from behind. 
Following the burial of the students the next morning, 
riots broke out in a number of commercial centres in Jakarta 
and continued on the next day. Shops were looted and 
burned down and well over a thousand people trapped in the 
shops were burnt to death. Gangs of men roamed the streets, 
waylaying women and perpetrating scores of gang-~apes. 
The vast majority of the victims were ethnic Chmese, 
giving the atrocity a racis! dime.nsion. . . . 
The atrocity has been mvest1gated by two mvest1gatlon 
teams. The first was the Joint Fact-Finding Team (Tim 
Gabungan Pencari Fakta) set up by the Habibie 
Government and known by its Indonesian initials as TGPF. 
The second was a special human rights team known as 
KPP-HAM set up by the National Human Rights 
Commission and chaired by Solahuddin Wahid. The TGPF 
held Prabowo responsible for plunging the country into 
chaos by ordering his Kopassus troops to abduct a number 
of student activists. However, the KPP-HAM placed 
responsibility for the chaos on Wiranto in his position as 
armed forces commander-in-chief. 
What is clear is that as the riots escalated, troops appeared 
to be under orders not to intervene, allowing the riots to 
proceed without hindrance. Moreover, far from taking 
action to halt the mayhem, Wiranto and other top military 
commanders left the capital to attend a meeting in East Java 
on 14 May, the purpose of which has never been explained. 
Casualties and victims of sexual assault 
An examination of the way in which the riots began and 
then unfolded makes it clear that they were not spontaneous 
but were orchestrated by provocateurs hoping to take 
advantage of the chaotic situation in order to take control of 
events as the Suharto regime collapsed and gave way to a 
new government. 
The TGPF which conducted investigations in six cities -
Jakarta, Solo, Surabaya, Lampung, Palembang and Medan -
drew attention to the role of provocateurs who incited 
crowds which had congregated in various parts of Jakarta, 
particularly in western Jakarta, where Trisakti University is 
located. These provocateurs incited the crowds; they delib-
erately stirred up trouble, indicated the places that should be 
attacked and encouraged people to start looting in the 
targeted properties. They were not local people and were 
well-equipped with implements suitable for the destruction 
of property; they were able to communicate easily with 
each other with the help of mobile phones and were able to 
move about speedily on motorbikes and jeeps. It was very 
difficult to identify these people though some of them in 
Medan were known to be members of a youth organisation, 
Pemuda Pancasila, (a pro-Suharto organisation of thugs set 
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up in the 1980s). 
Some of the more active crowds which became involved 
in the rioting were provoked into becoming very aggressive, 
damaging property and setting shops on fire. In Jakarta, 
Medan, and Solo, some of the people in these crowds were 
members of the armed forces. According to the TGPF, they 
were very well organised. The more passive crowds were 
mostly bystanders who just wanted to see what was going 
on, but were then drawn into acts of destruction. These are 
the people who were trapped inside buildings that were set 
alight and burned to death. 
shirts and carrying wooden sticks. Four or five female 
passengers were gang-raped, she is quoted as saying. She 
was unable to hold back the tears as she recounted the worst 
moments of her life. 'I don't care about politics, I don't care 
who becomes president or vice-president as long as he or 
she punishes those who did this to me,' she said. [Jakarta 
Post, 14 May 2004] 
Another account from a raped woman is given by the well-
known Catholic priest, Romo Sandyawan, who was a 
member of the TGPF, in an interview with the periodical, 
D&R, shortly after the May tragedy: 
Parking lot in the apartment building Mitra Bahari in North Jakarta. 
'The ones who suffered the most 
were the ethnic Chinese women, 
who were victims of sexual 
assault and rape. It was a terrible 
thing to listen to their stories. 
There were three sisters from one 
family. The oldest said that her 
two sisters were raped first, as 
fires were raging. One of them, 
after being raped, was kicked into 
the fire . It happened in front of 
other members of their family. 
Some were raped on the bus. 
There were many victims. We 
couldn't say how many but at least 
40 were raped. Don't expect the 
victims of these rapes to be able to 
identify the perpetrators. Perhaps, 
the single victim of a rape could 
do so but this was far too brutal. A 
12-year old girl was raped by 
seven or eight men and her 
breasts were covered with 
The Team acknowledged that it was very difficult to 
calculate the precise number of people who died or were 
injured. According to a Team of Volunteers cited by the 
TGPF, 1,190 people had burnt to death in Jakarta; 27 died 
from gunshot wounds and 91 people were injured. The 
number of casualties acknowledged by police and army 
units was far lower, but this was accounted for by the fact 
that ·many of the corpses had been removed from the scene 
by others in the crowd. 
The TGPF said that it was virtually impossible to say how 
many women were sexually assaulted or raped because of 
the sensitivity surrounding the issue. The investigators had 
received information from a number of sources, doctors and 
para-medics, spiritual leaders and relatives of the victims. 
Altogether they were able to verify 85 cases of sexual 
cruelty which occurred during the rioting. 
Gang-raped women speak out 
Two women later came forward with their personal 
accounts of being gang-raped; understandably their true 
identities were not divulged by the press. One who was 
referred to as Mey Ling was 28 years old, a final year 
student at a private university in West Jakarta. She was on 
her way home by bus when a number of men stopped the 
bus. 
'They shouted, where are the Chinese ... and they pulled 
me and other passengers of Chinese descent off. The driver 
of the bus and his assistant tried to stop them but they were 
outnumbered.' The male Chinese passengers were beaten up 
by the men, all of whom were wearing black, long-sleeved 
slashes. They were treated like 
animals. ' 
Romo Sandyawan also described visiting the hospital 
morgue. 'There were 970 bodies in the Cipto 
Mangunkusumo Hospital. I felt sick when I was there, not 
because of the terrible stench but because I was trying to 
comprehend the enormity of the bloodthirsty nature of the 
regime. I have dealt with many victims in sickness or death 
but the sight of so many burnt bodies was more than I could 
bear.' 
Recommendations ignored · 
In its report, the TGPF drew attention in particular to 
Lt.General Prabowo Subianto whose forces had been 
responsible for the abduction of students. It recommended 
that Prabowo and others involved in the abductions should 
be called to account before a military tribunal. Major-
General Syafrie Syamsoediin who was commander of the 
Jakarta military command and therefore responsible for 
security and order, should be asked to give an account of 
what had happened, it said. 
Summing up, the TGPF said that the events of 13 - 15 
May 1998, which occurred when there was a confluence 
between a severe economic crisis and a conflict within the 
political elite regarding the succession as the Suharto era 
drew to a close, should be seen as an attempt to create an 
emergency situation that would call for extra-constitutional 
powers to resolve the political crisis. 
None of the recommendations of the TGPF has ever been 
acted on. * 
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New politicians take centre stage 
2004 has been an eventful year for Indonesia, with elections being held for the national and 
regional parliaments and for the president. The presidential election in July failed to give any 
of the five candidates an absolute majority so a second round will be held on 20 September. 
Retired general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) who came first with 33.57 per cent of the 
vote will confront President Megawati Sukarnoputeri who received 26. 6 per cent. In April, 
there were elections for the national and regional parliaments. 
It is widely acknowledged that conducting free elections 
is the easy part of the transition to democracy, so 2004 was 
a test of how Indonesia's fragile democracy, only six years 
old, would cope. Overall, with the exception of Aceh and 
West Papua, the elections were successful. 
The presidential election 
The first ever direct presidential election in July went rela-
tively smoothly with more than 121 million of the 153 
million registered voters turning up to vote. Post-Suharto 
Indonesia is generally mentioned as being the world's third 
largest democracy, in terms of the size of the population, 
after India and the US, but if the electoral turnout were the 
benchmark, Indonesia could even be called the second 
largest, ahead of the US. 
After elections in April, July and September, the newly-
elected parliament, the regional parliaments and the DPD, 
the Regional Representative Council (a kind of first cham-
ber), will be installed, and the new president and his or her 
cabinet will be installed, which means that government will 
effectively start functioning in November. 
On 26 July, the General Elections Commission (KPU) 
announced the (almost final) result of the first round of the 
presidential election. (The five teams below consist of the 
presidential and vice-presidential candidates.). 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono/Yusuf Kalla 39,838,184 
votes (33.574 per cent). 
Megawati Sukarnoputeri/Hasyim Muzadi 31,569,104 
votes (26.605 per cent). 
Wiranto/Solahuddin Wahid 26,286,788 votes (22.154 per 
cent). 
Amien Rais/Siswono Yudhohusodo 17,392,931 votes 
(14.658 per cent) . 
Hamzah Haz/Agum Gumelar 3,569,861 votes (3.009 per 
cent). 
Twenty-one per cent of eligible, registered voters 
boycotted the elections. Of the 121 million votes, 2,635,976 
votes were declared invalid. 
The April and July elections 
Months before the presidential election, opinion polls 
indicated that the so-called outsider SBY (as Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono is commonly known), was the front-
runner. Although he lacks an effective campaigning organ, 
his new party, Partai Demokrat (PD), won almost 9 million 
votes in the April elections, garnering 57 seats in parlia-
ment. [See results of general elections below]. 
The way voters voted in July indicated that party loyalties 
did not play a significant role. It was Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono, whose party machinery was the weakest, who 
scored well in April and in July, though in the final weeks 
before the first presidential election, his popularity fell 
slightly. 
Wiranto, the other retired general standing for president, 
who, as GOLKAR's candidate, should have had the largest 
following and the best chance of support nationwide 
Peace/ ul election campaign 
performed woefully. Although Wiranto, along with his 
deputy, Solahuddin Wahid (W /SW) could have been 
expected to win the most votes, they were the biggest 
losers. This was despite the fact that Wahid, officially had 
the backing of one of the Muslim parties and Wiranto had 
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the backing of GOLKAR. In the April parliamentary 
elections, the two parties jointly won more than 36 
million votes but in July, votes for the duo fell to 26 
million. 
Rising from the ashes 
In an attempt to improve his chances, Wiranto under-
went a facelift before the July election. In 1998-1999, 
Wiranto had the worst possible image. Under the dicta-
tor Suharto, he took charge of the Indonesian armed 
forces and was seen as Suharto's golden boy. He was 
also held responsible for the devastating destruction of 
East Timor in September 1999 after the East Timorese 
voted overwhelmingly for independence. It was widely 
expected that it would only be a matter of time before 
he was arraigned on charges of crimes against human-
ity. But unfortunately, Indonesia's democracy has not 
yet shown the political will to deal with violators of 
gross human rights who continue to enjoy impunity. 
But thanks to a comprehensive facelift, Wiranto can be 
said to have risen from the ashes. A team of dentists 
patched up his teeth, he underwent a hair weave for the 
bald spots and he took a course in public relations. He 
created a new image for himself as the singing general 
with a CD of his songs going on sale and a perpetual 
smile on his face . Now he was ready to be launched as 
Indonesia's future president. However, the voters saw 
through the image-making and rejected Wiranto's 
candidacy. 
The presidential candidates For"!er cabinet mi~ister S~silo Bambang Y~dhoyono and 
The Amien Rais/Siswono Yudhohusodo (AR/SY) team President Megawat1, now rivals for the presidency. 
faced quite a dilemma. In theory they should have won 
at least 22 million, which is what the eight smaller parties 
which supported them had won in April. But in the event, 
their support declined by five million. 
By contrast, the Megawati/Hasyim Muzadi (MIHM) team 
did quite well. Their two parties, the PDl-P and PDS, had 
won 23 million in the general elections. In July, their joint 
showing rose to 31 million votes. 
But topping the polls was the SBY/Yusuf Kalla 
(SBY/YK) ticket. They won votes from all parties and 
tendencies. On paper SBY's candidacy was only backed by 
his party and two small parties, the PBB and the PKPI, with 
a total of 12 million votes in April, but in July, the SBY NK 
team won almost 40 million votes. 
With four of the five candidates obtaining a significant 
number of votes, it was clear that voters had spread their 
support across a wide range of choices. While political 
loyalties may have played a role, it was ultimately the 
image of the candidates that counted. 
SBY, a retired general with a friendly image, attracted 
voters from all sides. He won decisively in the heartland of 
East Java which is the base of Nahdatul Ulama (NU), the 
rural-based Muslim organisation. This was quite an 
achievement, considering that Hasyim Muzadi, Megawati's 
running-mate, chairs the NU and Solahuddin Wahid, the 
running mate of Wiranto, was the candidate of PKB, the 
NU's political wing. 
Within GOLKAR, Wiranto's candidacy was a contentious 
issue. As is widely acknowledged, money was the factor 
which secured his election as the party's presidential candi-
date at the National Convention of GOLKAR in May. But 
this turned out to be a pyrrhic victory. Support within 
GOLKAR, from its chairman, Akbar Tandjung, and 
throughout the party's extensive network, was half-hearted 
and Wiranto was sidelined. 
Akbar Tandjung has emerged again as one of the country's 
most powerful politicians and the acknowledged king-
maker. In the period preceding the second round presiden-
tial election on 20 September, SBY and Megawati will have 
to negotiate with GOLKAR to build a coalition, in return 
for which GOLKAR is sure to demand seats at the top of the 
table in cabinet and plenty of lucrative postings in the state 
companies. 
Hamzah Haz, the present vice-president and the chairman 
of the PPP, suffered a humiliating defeat, with only 3 per 
cent of the votes. In the Suharto days, the PPP as the only 
officially recognised Muslim party monopolised the 
Muslim vote but nowadays it has to compete with a number 
of Muslim parties. It advocates the establishment of a 
Muslim state, but by only winning 3.5 million votes, it is 
clear that the Indonesian electorate rejects this idea. 
Following his defeat, Hamzah Haz called on his supporters 
to vote for Megawati in the second round, which should win 
her a few million votes. 
Amien Rais entered the elections lacking a clear identity. 
His political style is one of compromise. While he has on 
occasion presented himself as representing urban Muslims, 
he also tried to make an appeal to secular voters. His party, 
PAN, projects the same confusing image. 
Just days before the July elections, Amien won the support 
of the PKS, an energetic, young Muslim group, as well as 
from sections of the pro-democracy movement, strongly 
boosting his position. Of all the five candidates, Amien was 
the only one to show a degree of support for democratic 
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reform and was therefore seen as the lesser evil by some 
groups in the NGO community. It is not yet clear where his 
votes will go to in the second round. [See section on 
Golput]. 
Megawati, the underdog 
The incumbent Megawati will have a tough time getting 
re-elected in September. So far, her campaigning team, Tim 
Sukses, has indeed been quite successful. The general elec-
tions in April were disastrous for Megawati 
and her party. She lost the majority in key 
places such as the capital Jakarta and West 
Java, striking the already tarnished image . 
yet another blow. For a brief moment, stal-
warts in her party, the PDIP, considered 
ditching her but her popularity among the 
rank of file was seen as being sizeable so the 
idea was dropped. 
The 26.6 per cent she acquired in the first 
round of the presidential elections was a 
reversal of her fortunes and the result of 
some heavy-handed tactics by her 
campaigning team. Their first move was to 
put her notoriously unpopular husband, 
Taufik Kiemas, on a leash. He was told not 
to make statements and to keep a low 
profile. This certainly improved the standing 
of the president, reducing the image of 
cronyism and nepotism which thrives 
because of the wheeling and dealing of her 
husband. 
Upgrade needed 
Clearly Mega's passive profile needed 
some pepping up which was ~on.e by stressing . 
her position as 'underdog', the v1ct1m under Suharto, 1.n 1996 
and 1997. Her ratings below SBY also helped to remforce 
this underdog image. 
Megawati's position as a woman was also turned ~o her 
advantage. Some right-wing Muslim clergY_ had. is~ued 
statements saying that it is an affront to Muslim prmc1ples 
for a woman to be head of state, but Indonesian Muslims do 
not go along with such extreme views and Megawati will be 
able to benefit from this slur as close to half the voters are 
Muslim women. 
In the first round Megawati won decisively in only six 
provinces, North Sumatra, Bangka-Belitung! Central Java, 
Bali, East Nusa Tenggara and West Kalimantan. Key, 
densely-populated areas like West Java, Jakarta, Yogyakarta 
and East Java all went to SBY so a lot of hard work will be 
needed by Mega's team to win votes in these plac~s. 
Her re-election would certainly be a great achievement. 
She has held key positions since 1999, initially as vice-pre~­
ident under Wahid for eighteen months, then after his 
impeachment, as president for three years. Sh~ wi.ll. be 
remembered by people as someone. who lacks social v!sion, 
who is distant, short in compassion and behaves like a 
Javanese princess. . . 
In the past two years, the price of oil has soared, givi~g a 
much-needed boost to the state coffers but as yet, direct 
investments both domestic and foreign, have remained 
sluggish, l~gely because of a lack of trust in her ability to 
run the country. 
ELECTIONS 
SBY, the leading candidate . 
In July, it was widely expected that SBY's popularity 
would secure him 40 to 50 per cent of the votes, perhaps 
even obviating the need for a re-run, so his 33.5 per ~ent 
was in many ways a disappointment and a cause for anxiety 
for him and his team in preparing for the September re-~un. 
Their main problem is how to stop the downward shde. 
Before the April elections SBY wore the mantle of under-
dog, having been unceremoniously removed from a key 
Elections in West Papua 
position in Megawati's cabinet, thanks to the intriguing 
husband. The Indonesian electorate always has a soft spot 
for underdogs, which was the case with Mega in the 1999 
elections, which she won. 
Another favourable factor for SBY is that he is seen as a 
gentle and considerate fellow, th~ nice guy ~ho will be. ~ble 
to restore Indonesia to economic prosperity and political 
stability. 
But some problems have emerged. His stints as co-ordi-
nating minister for security and politics under both Wahid 
and Megawati are now being closely scrutinised. He is 
being blamed by the right for indecision at crucial times 
when military operations in Aceh and West Papua were 
considered necessary but the left sees him as the man 
responsible for the military adventures in both places. 
The press is also focusing on the fact that he was Jakarta 
army chief of staff during the attack on the PDIP office in 
1996. 
So far, his coalition politics have been rather erratic. 
Although his running mate Yusuf Kalla, is regarded as a 
respectable South Sulawesi businessman with strong 
GOLKAR credentials, there is a dark side. He is now being 
criticised for harbouring anti-Chinese sentiments. The 
Chinese vote is quite substantial as the Chinese are the third 
largest ethnic group in Indonesia after the Javanese and 
Sundanese. 
SBY has become close to justice minister Yusril Ihsa 
Mahendra, who is concurrently the chair of PBB, one of the 
smaller Muslim parties. PBB openly propagates sharia law, 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 176, August 2004 9 
ELECTIONS 
which has given SBY a fundamentalist image. 
Although SBY is known as a military reformer, he has 
won support in many mi litary circles and several generals 
have joined his advisory team. With these retired officers 
jumping on the bandwagon, his democratic credentials have 
become tarnished. 
Military versus civilian 
It remains to be seen whether the issue of the military 
versus civilians will play a significant role in the second 
round. Election results in July show that the electorate is 
only partially affected by this dichotomy. Three out of the 
five teams included a retired general. Wiranto and SBY are 
retired four-star generals while Agum Gumelar, the running 
mate of Hamzah Haz, was a red beret special forces, three-
star army general. 
The results suggest that as the winner, SBY was not 
affected very much by his military background. So far his 
track record is relatively clean and inquiries into several 
human rights incidents have drawn blanks. But things were 
different for Wiranto. His woeful track record is well known 
in cities like Jakarta where a major upheaval took place in 
1998. The voters will not have forgotten his role in the 
tragedy of May 1998. [See separate article.] 
Golput, the 'white' voters 
Golput, an acronym of golongan putih, the white group, 
emerged in the early years of the Suharto dictatorship as a 
protest against the way elections were stage-managed. It 
meant going to the polling booth but invalidating the voting 
paper. Though Golput never became a mass movement, it 
was a well-publicised action by urban activists. As a dicta-
tor who was keen on projecting the appearance of legality, 
it was of prime importance to Suharto to hold elections. But 
the elections were rigorously controlled by the military and 
the results were never in doubt. 
Today's golput is different. It simply means not turning up 
.to vote and becoming an absentee. Gus Dur, as 
Abdurrahman Wahid is better known, has advocated golput, 
because he seriously doubts the capacity of the five candi-
dates. In part this may also be because he was disqualified 
as a presidential candidate on grounds of ill-health, a deci-
sion which he is challenging in the courts. Large sections of 
the pro-democracy movement still regard the post-~ictator­
ship structures (parliament, political parties. ~tc) with deep 
suspicion. Many argue that the present pohttcal constella-
tion is nothing but a continuation of Suharto's New Order, 
so joining political parties or voting is simply legitimising 
the old structures. 
Boycotting the elections through golput is intended as a 
political act to develop a new political democracy .in 
Indonesia. The latest figures suggest that golput will 
increase in September. In July, 20 per cent of registered 
voters are estimated not to have to cast their vote, with the 
majority being assessed as golput. Many prominent figures 
have advocated golput in the second round, including some 
leaders of Muhammadiyah, the modernist Muslim social-
religious organisation. 
Golput has become a more effective political act to express 
discontent with the slow rate of political reform. But the big 
question remains: how to transfer this discontent into a set 
of clear demands for change. 
The general elections revisited 
The 5 April general elections, the second after the fall of 
Suharto, were held under relatively peaceful conditions. 
Altogether 24 parties were given the go-ahead to compete 
for the 550 seats in parliament [See also TAPOL Bulletin 
No. 175, April 2004 'General elections: old wine in a new 
bottle?]. 
In most places the elections were relatively smooth. There 
were a few incidents such as money politics, holding 
unscheduled rallies, or using government facilities or public 
facilities like schools or places of worship but they were 
quickly reported to Panwaslu, the central and local supervi-
sory committees and dealt with. 
The only place where the Suharto Orde Baru tradition 
persisted was in Aceh, which is now under 'civil emer-
gency', after a year of martial law. The military made sure 
that the elections in Aceh would be a 'success story' and 
Acehnese were warned that failing to vote would risk being 
labelled pro-GAM. This was done to avoid a repeat of 1999 
when the Acehnese boycotted the general elections and only 
a quarter of the voters turned up. This time, under pressure, 
A go/put poster 
the turnout was well 
above 90 per cent, 
higher than anywhere 
else in the country. 
Pluralism 
Of the 24 parties, 
seven failed to win 
seats. The PDIP, 
Megawati's party and 
the biggest party in 
1999, was the biggest 
loser, down by 15 per 
cent. The second 
biggest party, Golkar 
consolidated its posi-
tion, losing only 0.88 
per cent. With a total of 
21.57 per cent, 
GOLK.AR emerged as 
the largest party. 
The three main 
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Muslim parties, PKB (Partai Kebang-kitan Bangsa of 
Abdurrachman Wahid), PPP (Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan of vice-president, Hamzah Haz) and PAN 
(Partai Amanat Nasional whose chairman is Amien Rais) 
each lost around two per cent. Two smaller Muslim parties, 
PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera) and PBB (Partai Bulan 
~intan~) gained votes. The PKS won a spectacular 45 seats 
m parliament as compared with 1999 when as a newcomer, 
then ca!led ~he PK (Partai Keadilan), it won a mere 1.4 per 
cent, with six seats. The PBB won more votes than in 1999 
but its seats fell from 13 to 11. 
. The other vote winner was PD (Partai Demokrat) the polit-
ical party of SBY. Although brand new with little organisa-
tional experience, it seized 57 seats to become the fifth 
largest party. 
Two other new parties worth mentio~ing are PBR and 
PDS. PBR (Partai Bintang Reformasi) is a spin off from the 
old Muslim federation PPP which managed to grab 13 seats 
while PDS (Partai Damai Sejahtera) set up by some 



































Note: The number of votes and percentages do not neces-
sarily correspond with the number of seats as the number of 
votes needed to secure a seat varies in each province. 
A few general conclusions can be 
drawn from the results. Pluralism has 
been achieved, with 17 parties gaining 
seats. The PDIP, the leading govern-
ment party received a thrashing, an 
expression of voter dissatisfaction with 
the Megawati government. The other 
leading party, GOLKAR also lost votes 
but was able to consolidate its position 
because of the power base it enjoys in 
many provinces outside Java, especially 
within the bureaucracy and reaching 
down to village level. 
ELECTIONS 
failed woefully. The nationalist party PDIP spin-offs, the 
PNI, Pelopor and PBNK, acquired four seats. This suggests 
that the electorate favoured mainstream parties while 
parties advocating a religious programme did second best. 
The new parliament 
Cynics still see DPR, the Indonesian parliament, as noth-
ing more than a rubber stamp. In the three decades of 
Suharto rule, parliament never exercised its legislative 
powers; it never initiated laws but simply passed laws 
drafted by the government. 
But the new parliament of 550 members is quite different 
from the 1999 line-up. Around 400 members are first-time 
MPs. The 1999 DPR had 500 members of whom 38 were 
from the armed forces or police, who occupied specially 
allocated seats. Now, all the members are elected with no 
seats for the military. 
The 1999 parliament was notoriously slow, inefficient, 
lacking professionalism, with a poor attendance rate. Any 
democratic legislature cannot operate without proper infor-
mation, support and expertise. The old DPR lacked these 
basics and time was needed before MPs could function 
properly. 
It will take time before the new MPs learn how to func-
tion in commissions and special committees. Hopefully, the 
2004 DPR will develop the genuine democratic tradition of 
having government and opposition parties. In the Suharto 
era and also after the first free elections in 1999, Indonesian 
politics was still upholding the idea of 'we are all in it 
together', ignoring the basic principles of parliamentary 
democracy. 
If small or medium-sized parties like PAN and PKS 
emerge as opposition parties, this will make parliament 
more lively and democratic. 
The new parliament will get down to work in October. 
The role of the military 
Indonesia's new democracy has taken some significant 
steps since 1999 though movement towards civilian 
supremacy has been painfully slow, not least because of the 
role the military still play in day-to-day politics. 
None of the small parties on the left 
(PIB, PBSD, Merdeka) with 
programmes advocating social democ-
racy, socialism or people's economy 
attracted many voters and they were 
unable to win any seats. Likewise on 
the right, the PKPB which favours a 
return to the good old days of Suharto 
failed to win many votes and won only 
two seats. The Pemuda Pancasila Party, 
also staunchly pro New Order, also 
Purnawirawan (retired officers) still enjoying theirprivileges, despite 
losing their seats in parliament (PEMILU =General Elections) 
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A few crucial problems continue to haunt Indonesia's polit-
ical life. Formally speaking, TNI, the Indonesian armed 
forces, has abandoned politics. They have no seats in parlia-
ment and by 2009, the TNI faction in the upper house, the 
People's Congress, will also be scrapped. But in reality, the 
TNI still plays a dominant role in politics. 
Gus Dur lost his presidency and was impeached after less 
than two years because he tried in vain to curb the powers 
of the military. During his short presidency, he sacked both 
Wiranto and SBY from his cabinet, only to see them re-
emerge as presidential candidates three years later. 
Megawati adopted a position of accommodation, allowing 
the military to destroy the peace process in Aceh by launch-
ing military operations and arresting the Acehnese peace 
negotiators. 
The Purnawirawan factor 
Under strictly enforced regulations, TNI officers must 
retire at 55 and often go on to secure well-paid posts with 
plenty of kickbacks in the administration. The governor of 
Jakarta and the district chief in Yogyakarta district are both 
retired officers. Purnawirawan is the Indonesian word for 
retired officer. This is not just a name; it is also a powerful 
institution. 
Purnawirawans have their own organisations and informal 
networks. The three decades of Suharto's New Order gave 
the purnawirawans access to power and economic wealth, 
and to this day, the majority of purnawirawans are unwill-
ing to relinquish this privilege. 
Officers like Wiranto, Agum Gumelar and SBY graduated 
from the military academy in the late sixties and early 
seventies, when Suharto and his inner core were building 
and consolidating the foundations for military domination 
in politics. The generation of cadets that graduated in the 
first half of the seventies are still on active duty and fill all 
the key positions in the TNI, and they are used to dominat-
ing. It is also true that the military are still the strongest and 
best organised political force in the country. 
The military have dominated politics for over three 
decades and it is long overdue for civilian politicians to 
demonstrate their capabilities, free from military control. 
But as yet, politicians in parliament have shown little will to 
defy the military and establish civilian supremacy. 
Draconian TNI Bill 
Ominously, a draft bill on the TNI has been tabled by the 
ministry of defence and the co-ordinating minister for secu-
rity and politics. It has been strongly criticised by military 
experts but so far the criticism has been ignored. 
If it is adopted into law, it will be a victory for the mili-
tary as it confirms the military territorial structure and limits 
the authority of the president. The territorial structure func-
tions as a shadow administration alongside the civilian 
structure down to village level and often acts as the real 
power. 
Where a state of emergency is deemed necessary, the top 
brass insist that the military should have the deciding voice 
about troop deployment. The law will limit the president's 
powers in decisions about going to war; other matters such 
as quelling social unrest or crushing secessionist move-
ments will fall under the authority of the TNI commander-
in-chief. 
According to schedule, the present parliament will end its 
term on 30 September and the new members will be inau-
gurated on the following day but the TNI is determined to 
push the bill through before the present parliament expires. 
The aim seems to be to get the bill adopted quickly with as 
little debate as possible. * 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
continued from page 15 
Information about licence applications is not published 
in advance, not even on a confidential basis to the 
members of the Quadripartite Committee as representa-
tives of Parliament, and it is not clear how Ministers apply 
the EU and national licencing criteria to each application. 
This means that any attempt to challenge the legality of 
decisions made by Ministers is virtually impossible. 
Ministers are allowed almost unfettered discretion in 
deciding licence applications. 
This proved to be the case when a human rights activist 
from Aceh, Aguswandi, recently failed in his attempt in the 
High Court to challenge by judicial review the legality of 
arms sales to Indonesia [see TAPOL Bulletin, No. 175, p. 
8]. 
Aguswandi argued that the Government has indicated, 
by its words and actions, that it will refuse licences only 
after equipment has been misused. In other words, it will 
wait until equipment is used to violate human rights 
before it will do anything more. This would be a clear 
breach of the requirement that it must refuse a licence if 
there is a clear risk that the equipment will be used for 
internal repression: the Government has unlawfully 
replaced the (proactive) 'clear risk' test by a (reactive) 
'evidence of misuse' test. 
Aguswandi also argued that decisions to issue licences 
were legally irrational in view of the human rights record 
of the Indonesian military. 
Permission for Aguswandi's application to proceed was 
refused because insufficient information was available 
about specific licences and decisions. 
The court did, however, say that if there was any demon-
strable evidence that British-supplied equipment had been 
used to commit specific human rights abuses, this would 
be decisive in law and should prevent the future export of 
similar equipment. 
US ban on military assistance continues 
Meanwhile, a key subcommittee of the US Congress has 
voted to renew a ban on International Military Education 
and Training (IMET) and foreign military financing 
(FMF) for Indonesia. 
The Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House of 
Representatives' Committee on Appropriations supported 
the extension of the ban on IMET until the State 
Department determines that the Indonesian military and 
government are co-operating with the FBI's investigation 
into an ambush which killed two US citizens and an 
Indonesian in West Papua. The ban was agreed before 
news emerged of the indictment of a suspect for the 
murders [see separate item]. 
The Foreign Operations Appropriations legislation is 
unlikely to be finalised until after November's US elections. 
* 
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Human rights NGOs under threat 
The news that twenty non-governmental organisations have been put onto a watch list for activ-
ities deemed to be detrimental to national security represents a further setback in Indonesia's 
advance towards ref ormasi which took centre stage when Suharto was forced to step down in 
May 1998 after ruling the country for thirty years. The surprise expulsion of Sidney Jones from 
the country added new urgency to the problem. 
The Brussels-based International Crisis Group, whose 
representative in Jakarta is Sidney Jones, is known to be one 
of the twenty 'problem' organisations included on the watch 
list, along with the Jakarta-based ELSAM (Institute for 
Policy Research and Advocacy), but all attempts to discover 
the names of the other eighteen have failed. Todung Mulya 
Lubis, a director of the ICG, told the press that when he met 
the senior government official, former general 
Hendropriyono, who issued the order for the expulsion of 
Sidney Jones, he asked for the names of the twenty NGOs on 
the list, but Hendropriyono refused to identify them. He did 
however imply that two ICG reports, one on Aceh and one on 
Papua, had sparked the government's ire. [Jakarta Post, 31 
May 2004] The national police chief, General Da'i Bachtiar, 
said that the authorities (he did not say which) were 'closely 
New Order against civil society which was a common prac-
tice during Suharto's leadership .... It is unfortunate that the 
culture is still alive in the so-called democratic era.' 
[Jakarta Post, 28 May] 
A culture of secrecy 
The secretiveness surrounding the list added to the sense 
of uncertainty that has engulfed the NGO community in 
Indonesia, especially in the run-up to the first presidential 
election on 5 July. 
The first indication that such a list existed came to light 
during a hearing at the Indonesian Parliament, the DPR, on 
25 May, when retired general, Hendropriyono, the chief of 
Biro Inteligen Nasional (BIN), the National Intelligence 
Agency, and a member of President Megawati's cabinet, 
alleged that some NGOs were 
suspected of seeking to create 
disturbances in the run-up to the 
presidential election on 5 July. 
Hendropriyono also took it upon 
himself to order the expulsion 
from Indonesia of Sidney Jones 
and her assistant, Francesca Lawe-
Davies, who had been working in 
Jakarta for two years on behalf of 
the International Crisis Group. 
The expulsion of Sidney 
Jones 
Reports that Sidney Jones had 
been ordered to leave the country 
first became public in May though 
she had been aware since 
February that she might not be 
able to renew her visa and work 
permit. She said in a statement 
before her departure from 
Indonesia that she had been trying 
========unsuccessfully for two months to 
Sidney Jones in discussion with Ibrahim Ambong, an Indonesian member of parlia- meet BIN director, Hendropriyono 
ment 
monitoring' activists of twenty local and foreign NGOs 'for 
issuing reports detrimental to national security'. 
ELSAM chair, lfdhal Kasim, while insisting that ELSAM 
had never violated any law, said he had no idea why his 
organisation had been included on t~e list as no. gov,e~ent 
or security officials had ever complamed about its .act1v1t1es. 
'This kind of intimidation is the old method apphed by the 
to discuss her organisation's work. 
[Jakarta Post, 27 May 2004] 
Sidney has spent most of her professional life living and 
working in Indonesia, initially for Amnesty International, 
then for Human Rights Watch and most recently for the 
International Crisis Group which focuses on monitoring 
conflict situations. While a student at Cornell University, 
she made a comprehensive study of Nahdatul Ulama, 
Indonesia's foremost Muslim organisation. 
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According to a comment titled Democracy Will Prevail, 
made public on I 0 June, Sidney pointed out that BIN had 
conveyed nothing directly to her about the reasons for the 
deportation. Moreover, officials of the intelligence agency 
had given different explanations when addressing several 
audiences behind closed doors. She was variously said to 
have spread slanders about Aceh and Papua, to have sold 
information abroad and to have pitted the army against Islam. 
One possible explanation, she said, was a growing suspi-
cion of foreigners, which has been fed by the strong wave 
of nationalism that has gripped Indonesia. There is great 
sensitivity about both Aceh and Papua (which, we may add, 
no doubt came in the wake of the government's and in 
particular the army's sense of grievance and humiliation at 
having 'lost' East Timor). As is widely known, there are 
guerrilla movements operating in both these provinces, both 
pursuing a pro-independence agenda but, as Sidney 
stressed, the ICG has remained strictly neutral in its 
comments about these conflicts, arguing that a properly 
conceived and implemented autonomy package could be 
the way forward. 
The ICG says that it is reasonably optimistic that the 
deportation order does not presage a return to the old 
system, before the downfall of Suharto, and that it would 
eventually be able to resume its activities in Indonesia. 
Gareth Evans, former Australian foreign minister who is 
now president of the ICG, deplored the decision, saying: 'To 
shoot the messenger doesn't say much for political liberty in 
Indonesia under the Megawati government.' 
Sidney herself has said on several occasions that she could 
not imagine living anywhere other than Indonesia, and she 
was confident that she would soon be back. As she pointed 
out, the deportation order was widely reported and 
condemned in the domestic press and cartoonists had had a 
field-day lampooning the authorities. She has been living in 
Singapore since her deportation and has made it clear that 
her extensive network of contacts in Indonesia and close 
reading of developments in the country will enable her to 
continue her monitoring of the situation. ICG director, the 
human rights lawyer, Todung Mulya Lubis, said that the 
ICG had no intention of closing down its office in Jakarta. 
The deportation order was sharply criticised by the US 
government. A spokesman for the State Department said: 
'We are not aware of any actions by her or other members 
of her organisation that would warranttaking such a step by 
Indonesia.' He described the action as being in stark contrast 
to recent progress made by Indonesia 'in developing a 
democratic civil society with freedom of expression'. 
In Indonesia, the National Human Rights Commission 
(Kornnas HAM) accused the government of abusing its 
power in expelling Jones. A group of media and human rights 
activists told members of parliament that the expulsion 
would serve as a 'bad advertisement' for Indonesia in the eyes 
of the international community. In an editorial called 'Back to 
the Suharto Years?' on 3 l May, The Jakarta Post warned that 
if the government failed to respond to criticism from NGOs, 
'it would be very difficult to deny that we were returning to 
the practices of (the) former repressive government'. 
Government sets up rights commission 
Much to the surprise of the human rights community in 
Indonesia, it was announced in June that the government has 
set up a national human rights committee. The committee is 
to be chaired by the minister of justice and human rights and 
will be answerable to the president. Similar committees will 
be set up in all the provinces, answerable to the governor. 
While cautiously welcoming the government's move,. a 
member of the long-established Kornnas HAM, Zoemrotm 
K. Susilo, said that though the two human rights bodies 
might be able to work together, 'only Komnas HAM has the 
authority to investigate or mediate in instances where gross 
violations of human rights are alleged to have occurred'. 
Hendropriyono, the Butcher 
So who is the man who has decided to take on the coun-
try's highly respected NGOs? 
Following the downfall of Suharto in May 1998, he 
became minister of transmigration in the cabinet of B.J. 
Habibie. Hendropriyono was instrumental in Megawati 
Sukarnoputri's emergence as leader of the nationalist party, 
the PDI, which later became known as the PDI-P 
(Indonesian Democracy Party - Struggle). It was under her 
presidency that Hendropriyono was appointed chief of the 
armed forces intelligence agency, BAKIN, which subse-
quently merged with other intelligence agencies to become 
BIN. This put him in charge of all intelligence activities 
and earned him a seat in Megawati's cabinet. No intelli-
gence chief has previously held such a prominent position 
in Indonesia. 
Megawati's promotion ofHendropriyono, a man widely 
condemned by human rights NGOs for his appalling human 
rights record, is seen as payback for his political backing, 
ultimately taking her to the presidency. 
Hendropriyono is no stranger to the NGO community in 
Indonesia. Events that led to his being branded the 'Butcher 
of Lampung' go back fifteen years when he was military 
commander of the Way Jepara district, Central Lampung. In 
February 1989, hundreds of villagers were massacred in a 
bloody attack by heavily armed troops, supported by heli-
copters and crack troops from the Mobile Brigade. The 
pretext for this slaughter was the death of an army officer, 
Captain Soetiman. 
A month earlier, a number of villagers who had been hold-
ing religious meetings known as usroh in their homes were 
arrested and badly tortured by Captain Soetiman and his 
men. These religious gatherings were regarded as not being 
in accord with religious practices officially permitted at the 
time. In retaliation, villagers ambushed the vehicle the 
captain was travelling in and took him hostage. They later 
offered to release him in exchange for the release of their 
colleagues, but they came under attack by the troops, and it 
was during this attack that the captain was killed. 
During this attack, almost all the inhabitants of the village 
were killed. Human rights NGOs later established that 246 
villagers had perished, of whom 127 were women and 94 
were under the age of 17. The victims were buried in 
unknown graves. Despite calls for an investigation into the 
massacre and for those responsible to be brought to justice, 
nothing was done and Hendropriyono's career in the army 
was not affected. * 
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ARMS SALES 
MPs accuse Government of ignoring 
misuse of British arms in Aceh 
A committee of MPs has accused the UK Government off ailing to investigate claims that UK-
built military equipment has been used in violation of human rights or for offensive purposes 
in Aceh. An official report has also revealed that, despite widespread parliamentary and public 
concern about the human rights record of the Indonesian military, the Government continues 
to back the sale of military equipment to Indonesia. 
The inadequacies of procedures for monitoring the end 
use of British equipment, were exposed by the influential 
cross-party Quadripartite Committee on Strategic Exports 
in its Annual Report for 2002, published on 18 May. 
In a wide-ranging indictment of Government policy, the 
Committee also questioned the value of end-use 'assur-
ances' provided by Indonesia. It strongly criticised the 
Government for its lack of transparency in explaining why, 
in August/September 2002, it allowed Indonesia to weaken 
the 'assurances' at a time when the Indonesian military was 
continuing to conduct offensive operations in Aceh. 
The Committee's inquiry into the use of British equipment 
in Aceh was prompted in part by evidence provided by 
TAPOL and Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT). 
UK-supplied Hawk jets and Saracen and Stormer 
armoured personnel carriers (APCs) were used in 
Indonesia's year-long martial law offensive in Aceh. At 
least 2,000 people were killed during the offensive, which 
lasted from May 2003 to May 2004. Although, martial law 
has now been lifted [see separate item], military operations 
continue with the ongoing risk that British equipment will 
be used to violate human rights. 
The Committee said it had 'seen no evidence that the 
Government has taken any action (other than talking to the 
Indonesian authorities) to investigate claims that British-
built equipment has been used in violation of human rights 
or offensively in Aceh'. It added that 'This calls into ques-
tion the importance of such assurances in the eyes of the 
Government'. 
The Committee referred specifically to a press report cited 
by TAPOL and CAAT. The report detailed the showing on 
Indonesian television of heavy machine guns mounted on 
Scorpion tanks firing at 'alleged separatist positions'. [In 
fact it transpires that these vehicles were more likely to be 
Saracens or Stormers than Scorpions, although all are UK-
supplied military vehicles.] The Committee stated that it 
was not presented with any evidence that the Government 
examined the TV footage and called on the Government to 
explain what steps it has taken. Although the Foreign 
Office has since told TAPOL and CAAT that it has insuffi-
cient details to follow up the report, it is difficult to believe 
that the British Embassy could not have tracked down the 
footage with a little effort. . 
In September 2002, the Government controversially 
allowed Indonesia to weaken the conditions under which 
licences to Indonesia were granted, allowing British equip-
ment to be used in Aceh at a time when the human rights 
situation was deteriorating. Previously, the use of British 
equipment in Aceh was not permitted under any circum-
stances unless advance notification was provided to the 
British Government. However, neither the Committee nor 
anyone else in Parliament was made aware of the change of 
policy until June 2003. The Government failed to explain 
the reason for the change of policy and the Committee was, 
therefore, forced to conclude that: ' . .. there has been a seri-
ous lack of clarity in the Government's explanation to us of 
its rationale for allowing the Indonesian authorities to alter 
end-use undertakings regarding their use of British-built 
military equipment' . 
Reflecting the views of TAPOL and CAAT that in any 
event the undertakings are worthless, the Committee went 
on to say that 'without more legal or political backbone, end-
use assurances are not worth the paper they are written on' 
The Committee further expressed the suspicion that 'the 
principal function of the end-use assurances is to shield the 
exporting Government from criticism when exporting 
equipment is misused.' 
Arms sales increase 
The Government's reluctance to change policy is no doubt 
due to the strategic and economic importance it attaches to 
the arms trade with Indonesia. The annual report on mili-
tary exports for 2003, published in June, revealed that 110 
standard licences with a value of £12.5 million were 
approved during the year for equipment ranging from 
components for combat aircraft, tanks, and aircraft machine 
guns to air guns and missile launching equipment. TAPOL 
and CAAT are awaiting a further explanation of the exact 
nature of this equipment. 
A subsequent quarterly report on licensing decisions made 
between January and March 2004, published in July, 
revealed a substantial increase in the number of licences. A 
total of 41 standard licences for Indonesia were issued in 
the period, equivalent to an annual increase over 2003 of 
almost 50 per cent. The total value of the licence applica-
tions for Indonesia was £5.5 million, equivalent to a 76 per 
cent. increase. 
No transparency thwarts judicial review 
Regrettably, the decision-making process on export 
licences remains murky and secretive. Although the 
Government now publishes a limited amount of information 
in its annual reports on strategic exports, substantially more 
information remains hidden than is revealed. 
continued on page 12 
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Papuans face uncertain future 
Despite the emergence off urther evidence from the US that the 1969 Act of Free Choice -
which consigned West Papua to decades of harsh and repressive Indonesian rule - was a sham, 
little progress is being made towards providing Papuans with the autonomy some are prepared 
to accept as a step towards self-determination. 
Secret documents released by the Washington-based 
research group, the National Security Archive, on the 35th 
anniversary of the Act of Free Choice, confirm that the US 
approved and supported the rigged referendum despite being 
aware of the Papuans overwhelming desire for indepen-
dence (1). For reasons associated with Cold War politics, 
the US was keen to avoid confronting the anti-Communist 
regime of General Suharto, which had control of the terri-
tory, then known as West Irian. The documents also high-
light Washington's failure to respond to death threats and 
In 1962 Kennedy and Sukarno struck a deal behind the 
backs of the Papuans 
extensive human rights violations against Papuans. 
In July 1969, the US Ambassador to Indonesia noted that 
'past abuses had stimulated intense anti-Indonesian and pro-
independence sentiment at all levels of Irian society' and 
suggested that 'possibly 85 to 90% of the population are in 
sympathy with the Free Papua cause'. The process was 
summarised in a US Embassy telegram: 
'The Act of Free Choice (AFC) in West lrian is unfolding 
like a Greek tragedy, the conclusion preordained. The main 
protaganist, the GOL cannot and will not permit any reso-
lution other than the continued inclusion of West lrian in 
Indonesia. Dissident activity is likely to increase but the 
Indonesian armed forces will be able to contain and, if 
necessary, suppress it. ' 
A detailed analysis of the documents by retired US Foreign 
Service Officer and former Political Counsellor at the US 
Embassy in Jakarta, Ed McWilliams, appeared in TAPOL 
Bulletin No 173/174 published in December 2003. 
In response to the documents' release, an editorial in the 
Jakarta Post newspaper urged the Indonesian Government 
to face the issue of the flawed referendum head-on and talk 
to the Papuans about the issue (2). The Papuans themselves 
have long been advocating such dialogue as a means of 
resolving the conflict. The Government of Vanuatu has 
offered to hold peace talks between West Papuan and 
Indonesian Government representatives at the end of July, 
but so far Indonesia's response has been non-committal. 
Referring to an international campaign concerning the Act 
of Free Choice (3), the Jakarta Post said: ' ... something is 
brewing on the international front. In March this year, Irish 
parliamentarians urged UN Secretary General Kofi Annan 
to review the world body's role in the 1969 referendum, 
joining South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu and 
scores ofNGOs and European Parliamentarians'. 
The internationalisation of the West Papua case is certainly 
causing concern for the Government in Jakarta and could 
becoming an increasingly important spur to progress. 
Special autonomy chaos continues 
The Jakarta Post also called upon the Indonesian 
Government to honour its promise of special autonomy for 
West Papua. Although special autonomy falls far short of 
the self-determination wanted by the overwhelming major-
ity of Papuans and is regarded by many as a cynical attempt 
to weaken support for independence, some are prepared to 
accept it as a step towards that objective and a means to give 
Papuans greater control over their own development, espe-
cially in the areas of health and education. 
However, special autonomy remains another unfulfilled 
promise from Jakarta due to the chaos caused by 
Government's provocative attempt to split West Papua into 
three provinces ( 4). This divide-and-rule tactic is regarded 
as a further move to undermine support for independence as 
well as an opportunity for the military to increase its 
numbers and level of economic activity in the territory. 
In June 2004, Papuan religious leaders warned the 
Government of worsening problems if it failed to imple-
ment special autonomy. In a strongly-worded statement, 
the deputy chairman of the Communion of Churches in 
Papua, Socratez Sofyan Yoman said: 
'The churches in Papua can no longer remain silent if injus-
tice and human rights abuses in the province continue. So 
far we cannot continue to maintain a neutral stance because 
the political issues now encompass injustice, human rights 
abuse, extortion, insults and poverty' (5). 
Yoman's statement was made after a meeting with the 
President of the Constitutional Court, which is reviewing the 
legality of Presidential Decree 1/2003 dividing West Papua 
into three provinces. The application for judicial review was 
made by the Chairman of the DPRD provincial legislature 
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station in which one police officer was killed. The torture 
of the prisoners was witnessed and later 
graphically described by a Swiss journalist 
who had been arrested for alleged abuse of 
his tourist visa (8). Two other persons 
suffered permanent injuries and one has 
since died. 
Emotional scenes in 2001 during the burial of Papuan leader Theys Eluay who 
was killed by Indonesian troops. 
It is not clear why more police officers 
have not been charged. An investigation 
by Indonesia's National Commission on 
Human Rights (Komnas HAM) named 25 
officers as suspects (9). The two men 
charged are Johny Wainal Usman, 
Jayapura commander of the Mobile 
Brigade (Brim ob) police special forces at 
the time of the incident and the then 
Jayapura police chief, Daud Sihombing. 
assert that Decree 1/2003 contravened the law on special 
autonomy passed in October 2001. The campaign against 
the three-way split had earlier received a major boost after 
the State Administrative Court ruled that a law appointing 
Abraham Octavianus Atururi as the governor of West Irian 
Jaya was contrary to the law on special autonomy (6). 
Key to the implementation of special autonomy is the 
establishment of a Papuan People's Assembly (MRP). 
Under the special autonomy law, the MRP, whose member-
ship should include representatives of traditional/tribal 
leaders, religious communities and women, is given various 
powers including the right to give prior approval to any 
division of the province. President Megawati has delayed 
signing the necessary implementing regulation amid fears 
that she is intent on weakening the MRP's powers. 
Presidential candidate Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has 
pledged to speed up the establishment of the MRP and 
promised to revise all laws that contradict the special auton-
omy law (7). This issue will be a major early test for the 
Indonesian administration which comes into power after the 
second round of the Presidential elections on 20 September. 
Senators call for UN Special Representative 
Meanwhile, US Senators have launched an important 
initiative aimed at resolving the conflicts and improving the 
human rights situations in West Papua and Aceh by calling 
upon the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, to appoint a 
Special Representative to Indonesia to monitor and report 
on the two provinces. In a letter to Kofi Annan dated 28 
June 2004, they said the scale of human rights violations 
warrants special attention by the international community, 
which has remained too quiet on the conflicts for too long. 
The Indonesian Government rejected the initiative and 
berated the Senators for interfering in Indonesia's internal 
affairs. 
Abepura trials begin 
After much delay, the first trials for gross human rights 
abuses in West Papua began in Indonesia's newly-estab-
lished human rights court in Makassar, South Sulawesi, 
which has jurisdiction over West Papua. Two senior police 
officers are being tried separately on crimes against human-
ity charges in relation to their command responsibility for 
the killing of Elkius Suhunaib, 18, and arbitrary detention 
and torture of scores of others, which resulted in the deaths 
of Johny Karunggu, 18, and Orry Doronggi, 17, in police 
custody at Abepura in December 2000. 
The police raided three student dormitories in Abepura 
after an attack by unidentified persons on the local police 
Two other senior officers named by Komnas HAM - the 
provincial police chief, Sylvanus Wenas and his deputy, 
Moersoetidarno Moerhadi - have not been charged. The 
trials of the two accused are continuing. 
Refugees: A cause for concern 
The fallout from the conflict continues to be felt in neigh-
bouring Papua New Guinea (PNG) as refugees cross the 
border to camps near the town of Vanimo on a daily basis 
(10). Concern has been expressed recently that some 400 
refugees will be moved to camps at East Awin against their 
wishes. East Awin has a reputation for being almost unin-
habitable, bad for growing crops and rife with malaria. A 
number of refugees have died after moving there. 
On a more positive note, over 1200 children born to West 
Papuan refugees in PNG have been given birth certificates 
and a legal identity they previously lacked in a programme 
assisted by the UN High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR) (11) . * 
Notes: 
1. See 'Indonesia's 1969 Takeover of West Papua Not by 
"Free Choice"' at: 
http://www.gwu.edu/% 7Ensarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB 128 
/index.htm 
2. 'Spotlight on Papua', Jakarta Post, 16 July 2004. 
3. See TAPOL Bulletin No. 166/167 at p. 27. For further 
details of the campaign and supporting documents, visit 
http://westpapuaaction.buz.org/unreview 
4. See TAPOL Bulletin No. 173/174 at p. 11; and TAPOL 
Bulletin No. 175 at p. 21. 
5. 'Religious leaders warn government of chaos in Papua', 
Jakarta Post, 25 June 2004. 
6. See 'W Irian Jaya Governor Illegitimate: Court', Jakarta 
Post, 16 June 2004. 
7. See 'Susilo Pledges to Implement Papua Special 
Autonomy Law', Jakarta Post, 10 June 2004. 
8. See TAPOL Bulletin No. 161 at p. 20. 
9. See TAPOL Bulletin No. 162 at p. 18. 
10. See 'Papua New Guinea Camp Reports Influx of 
Indonesian Border-Crossers', BBC Monitoring, 12 May 
2004. 
11. See 'Refugee children granted legal recognition in 
PNG', Radio Australia, Pacific Beat, 14 May 2004; and 
'Birth Certificates Issued to Indonesian Refugees in Papua 
New Guinea' BBC Monitoring, 11 May 2004. 
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Freeport indictment leaves many unanswered questions 
The surprise announcement by the US Department of Justice on 24 June that an alleged 
commander of the Free Papua Movement (OPMITPN), Anthonius Wamang, had been indicted 
in connection with the killing of an Indonesian and two Americans near the Freeport copper-
and-gold mine in Timika in August 2002 has left many unanswered questions about the long-
suspected role of the military in the deadly attack. It has also been seen by many as a ill-
disguised attempt to open the way for renewed military ties between the US and Indonesia. 
Initial investigations by the Indonesian police and the 
respected West Papuan human rights organisation, ELS-
HAM, provided strong indications that Kopassus special 
forces officers or other army units were involved in the 
ambush on a convoy of buses carrying teachers and children 
from Freeport's international school (1). The evidence 
suggested that, whereas Papuan proxies may have partici-
pated in the attack, the operation was conceived and orches-
trated by the military. 
The then military commander of West Papua, Major-
General Mahidin Simbolon, himself a Kopassus officer and 
a veteran of counter-insurgency operations in East Timor, 
was quick to blame the OPM, but his claims were met with 
considerable scepticism. 
The initial investigations raised questions about the ability 
of the OPM to sustain a 45-minute attack with the basic 
weaponry at their disposal. The investigations also pointed 
to the fact that the attackers were well-trained sharpshooters 
and that the site of the attack was tightly secured by the 
military and would have been impossible to reach without 
military co-operation. Military personnel appeared on the 
scene only after the attack had ended despite it being close 
to a permanently-staffed security post (2). 
Suspicion was also raised by the fact that a Papuan alleged 
by the military to have been involved in the attack had 
apparently been dead for at least 12 hours before the attack. 
An unsubstantiated report published in the Washington Post 
in November 2002 suggested that the ambush was 
discussed in advance at the highest level of the army. Other 
media reports, subsequently denied by the US embassy in 
Jakarta, indicated that US officials firmly believed the mili-
tary was involved. 
Obstructions 
Joint investigations by the Indonesian police and the FBI 
have faced persistent obstructions and a lack of co-opera-
tion from the military. In January 2003, the deputy police 
chief, Brig. Gen. Raziman Tarigan, who had headed the 
initial police investigation, was withdrawn from the case 
along with Police Commissioner H Sumarjiyo the police 
chief of Mimika (which covers Timika). A team of police 
and army personnel - a so-called koneksitas team - was then 
set up to take over the investigation. This was seen as a 
move to undermine the police investigation and to allow the 
military to establish its version of the crime. 
The military has also resorted to intimidation of ELS-
HAM through the courts. At the end of June the army was 
awarded 50 million rupiah damages in a libel action against 
the human rights group, which accused it of involvement in 
the Freeport attack. The verdict is a major setback for free-
dom of expression in West Papua and ELS-HAM is consid-
ering an appeal. 
Significantly, the Department of Justice press release on 
the indictment referred to Indonesian government and police 
co-operation with the investigation, but did not mention 
military co-operation. The press release also indicated that 
the investigation is ongoing and that additional suspects are 
being sought. The US administration is being asked to 
confirm that the military has not yet been exonerated. 
OPM alleges cover-up 
An official statement by the OPM denied involvement in 
the attack and accused the authorities in Jakarta and 
Washington of 'a blatant cover-up' (3). The organisation 
repeated its condemnation of the atrocity and the killing of 
innocent civilians. 
The OPM went on to deny that the accused had ever been 
an OPM commander, but said he was a suspected member 
of Cassowary Force, a pro-Jakarta Papuan militia set up by 
the military. It further alleged that the accused had flown 
regularly between Papua and Jakarta for meetings with the 
military and stated that he had been involved in the sandal-
wood trade in partnership with the military. It pointed out 
that the military has a long history of supporting proxy mili-
tias in East Timor and West Papua. 
Renewal of US-RI military ties resisted 
The murder of the two American citizens remains a major 
stumbling block to the resumption of full military relations 
between the US and Indonesia. There is suspicion that the 
US authorities took the unusual step of issuing an indict-
ment before the investigation was completed for political 
reasons associated with the administration's wish to renew 
military ties. In January, Congress restored a ban on 
International Military, Education and Training (IMET) and 
foreign military financing of weapons sales until the State 
Department determines that the Indonesian Government 
and military are co-operating with the FBI investigation 
into the Freeport killings [see also separate item on British 
arms in Aceh]. 
Since the indictment was announced, Indonesia has been 
pushing hard for the normalisation of military relations. 
Campaigners - including Patsy Spier a survivor of the 
attack, which killed her husband Rick - are lobbying hard 
for such a move to be resisted until the investigation into the 
military's role in the ambush is completed. The campaign-
ers also insist that restrictions should remain in place until 
the military is made to account for human rights atrocities 
committed in East Timor and until its human rights record 
improves in areas such as Aceh and West Papua. 
18 TAPOL Bulletin No. 176, August 2004 
Military to lose security role? 
In a separate development, moves are afoot to end the mili-
ta~'s controversial role in protecting vital assets, such as 
mm~s .. Despite earlier indications that the military would 
retam its role [see TAPOL Bulletin No 175, p. 20], President 
Megawati has approved a proposal that would leave secu-
rity in_ the hands of the companies concerned (4). 
According to in~erim political and security minister, Hari 
S~b~rno, authonty w~ll be transferred from the military 
wtthm a year. The police will be expected to deploy person-
nel to installations in the event of disturbances and soldiers 
will be able to intervene only at the request of the police. 
There remain questions, however, about how this will work 
in practice given the limited resources of the police. 
Some of the worst human rights violations in Indonesia are 
co_mmitted by the military in the vicinity of major enter-
pnses such as the Freeport mine. The provision of security 
at vital enterprises generates huge amounts of revenue for 
the military and there is a strong suspicion that the Freeport 
attack was carried out to warn Freeport not to deprive the 
army of its lucrative security role at the mine. * 
Notes: 
I. See also earlier TAPOL Bulletin reports: No. 169/170, p. 
22; No. 171 / 172, p. 18; No. 1731174, p. 12; and 175, p. 20. 
2. See RFK Memorial Center for Human Rights 
(Washington DC), press release, 26 June 2004. 
3. See West Papuan People's Representative Office, 
Vanuatu, press release, 29 June 2004. 
4. See TNI to leave vital facilities within a year, Jakarta 
Post, 25 June 2004; and Military to quit mine protection, 
Courier Mail (Brisbane), 26 June 2004. 
STOP PRESS: PAPUAN RIGHTS GROUPS 
CONDEMN US ACTION 
The following statement was issued by the West Papuan 
human rights organisations, ELSHAM, LEMASA and 
YAMAHAK, in response to the US indictment of 
Anthonius Wamang: 
Timika and Jayapura, West Papua, 4 August, 2004 
ELSHAM, LEMASA and YAHAMAK, human rights 
groups in West Papua which extensively assisted the FBI in 
its investigation of the killing of two Americans at the 
Freeport mine in August 2002, today expressed their grave 
concern over the actions of the US Attorney General, John 
Ashcroft, and called for the US Congress to facilitate a full, 
impartial investigation. 
Attorney General Ashcroft is apparently suppressing 
evidence in the Justice Department's possession, evidence 
that would be of great interest to the US Congress and the 
Freeport victims' families. 
Ashcroft suggested that Anthon Wamang was acting as a 
member of the Free Papua Movement (OPM) when his 
group carried out the attack at Freeport; said that he now 
faced the death penalty, and referred to 'separatists' who 
would be hunted down in the forests. By so doing he gives 
a green light to the Indonesian military (TNI) to go after 
Papuan dissidents (since the TNI classifies all opponents of 
their presence in Papua as 'separatists'), in spite of the fact 
that suppressed evidence suggests that the military was 
behind the ambush. And indeed since the Ashcroft state-
ment our three organizations in Papua have been subjected 
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to a new round of threats and intimidation by the military. 
Although it is still not clear exactly who was the overall 
mastermind of this attack, an impartial reading of the facts 
points as much to the military as to the OPM. Attorney 
General Ashcroft failed to inform the public and the 
Congress of three crucial pieces of evidence, all three of 
which were almost certainly in the possession of the US 
Justice Department: 
1. Though identified simply as an OPM field commander, 
Anthon in fact lived in the city of Timika where he was a 
business partner of Kopassus, the Indonesian army special 
forces. Anthon told our three organizations together with 
FBI agents that he was in the eaglewood and gold business 
with Indonesian military personnel. Though Anthon had in 
fact been in the field at various times with the OPM over the 
past 22 years, at the time of the attack he was living and 
working alongside Kopassus, not the OPM. 
According to its own field manuals and also public state-
ments of its commanders, Kopassus specializes in infiltra-
tion and provocation operations. They have done so for 
years in West Papua, as in East Timor, Aceh and Maluku. 
Monitors ranging from KomnasHAM (the official 
Indonesian national human rights commission) to the US 
State Department to groups like Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch have extensively documented the fact 
that the Indonesian military routinely uses civilians to stage 
attacks, especially co-opted or coerced members of local 
rebel or opposition groups. In West Papua such activities 
have included aiding and guiding dissident rebel factions in 
kidnapping operations and theft of military weapons. 
2. Anthon got his ammunition from the military, not the 
OPM. Anthon told our organizations and the FBI that he got 
his ammunition from TNI personnel. He said that the offi-
cers he dealt with knew exactly who he was and knew that 
he was about to carry out an attack in the Freeport conces-
sion. 
Our organizations know that this evidence was in the 
hands of the FBI since we gave it to them and later had 
extensive discussions about it with them. The agents 
acknowledged the validity of these facts and sent ELSHAM 
an email in March that suggested they were aware of the 
TNI,s use of local people for provocation operations. 
3. The investigation by the Police Regional West Papua 
led by a very well respected ex- Police Chief of West Papua 
Gen. Made Pastika concluded that the TNI was behind the 
ambush. The police believe that Mr. X (the man who was 
found dead on 1 September near the ambushed site) was 
shot the day before and then taken to the ambushed site to 
invite attention from the Police investigators. In fact when 
the Police conducted the investigation they were fired 
at few times by the TNI members that based 2 kilo meters 
away from the ambushed site. 
Why did Attorney General Ashcroft not mention these 
crucial facts in his statement? And why did he point the 
finger away from the military and exclusively towards the 
OPM instead? 
Attorney General Ashcroft's actions are especially trou-
bling in the light of three pieces of background information 
which suggest that the military had a motive for an attack 
and that the OPM did not. 
First, for years the Freeport company had been making 
large cash payments to the military--for instance from 2000 
to 2002 Freeport paid US$ 10.7 million to TNI. Yet in July 
continued on page 22 
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Military operations in Aceh fail 
Human rights conditions in Aceh continue to be deplorable. Although the military campaign 
has been cut back slightly, the military presence and the lack of freedom of movement is stifling 
daily life in Aceh. In the countryside, especially in areas seen as GAM strongholds, the social 
structure has suffered severely. 
The peace process in Aceh was abruptly ended with the 
military operations that started in May 2003. TNI, the 
Indonesian anned forces, had come to the conclusion that 
the cease fire provided the opportunity for GAM, the Free 
Aceh Movement, to consolidate itself. The TNI leadership 
basically took over the Aceh political agenda of the cabinet 
by opting for a military campaign. Cabinet ministers were 
told that the military approach was the only option. After 
the military defeat of GAM, they were persuaded to believe, 
the separatist remnants could be dragged into new talks, 
ultimately accepting NKRI, the unitary state of Indonesia. 
Leaders of political fractions were given the same message. 
The issue was never discussed in Parliament. After more 
than a year of military operations, the scenario turned out to 
be a total failure . 
The ultimate aim of winning a war is to win hearts and 
minds, but military operations in Aceh have always had the 
opposite effect. During the DOM period (1989-1998), 
Indonesian military operations resulted in the spectacular 
growth of GAM and enhanced its popularity among the 
population. All the signs are that the present military opera-
tions will have the same effect and alienate the population 
even more from Jakarta. 
From martial law to civil emer-
gency 
When martial law ended in May 2004, not 
a single high-ranking GAM commander had 
been caught, nor had peace been restored. 
But instead of examining the facts and 
admitting that martial law had failed, Jakarta 
opted to continue with the military approach 
by granting Aceh another special status, now 
called 'civil emergency'. It was under 
martial law that the April general election 
was conducted in Aceh. 
Under martial law all the basic freedoms 
were abrogated, so how democratic can elec-
tions be under such circumstances? Holding 
elections in such a situation has only served 
to reinforce the conflict between GAM and 
the military for survival and power. 
When martial law was lifted on 19 May, 
some people were satisfied that their demands had been met. 
However, those who are striving for peace in Aceh and 
meaningful democracy in Indonesia know only too well that 
little has been achieved. On 20 May, Aceh was still a mili-
tarised territory and peace a distant dream. The lifting of 
martial law was meaningless for the Acehnese while military 
operations continued. The military approach means that 
dialogue has been spurned. After martial law had been lifted, 
the commander-in-chief of the army told the press that mili-
tary operations would continue and not a single soldier 
would be withdrawn. 
Civil emergency simply shifts the locus of authority in the 
province. While under martial law, ultimate authority was 
vested in the military, the province is now under the author-
ity of the governor of Aceh. When these new powers were 
conferred on him, Governor Abdullah Puteh (who inciden-
tally is facing grave corruption charges) described his 
authority as follows: 'It's like this. Whereas before I helped 
the military and the police, now it's the other way around. 
They help me.' 
This shuffling around is simply a re-run of what happened 
in 1998 when the notorious DOM (Daerah Operasi Militer 
- Military Operational Zone) was lifted. Then too, military 
operations continued. The military will continue to deter-
mine the methods used to resolve the situation in Aceh. 
Human rights abuses 
Since martial law was declared in Aceh in May 2003, 
more than two thousand people have been killed, 2, 100 
people have been arrested, and hundreds have been tried in 
courts, without any pretense of due legal process. We are 
also told that 1,276 people surrendered to the anny. 
(Jakarta Post, 24 May 2004 ). 
Chained GAM suspects baing transported to prisons in Java 
Photo:Aceh Kita 
This amounts to more than five thousand people, yet when 
martial law was declared, the military alleged that GAM 
had between three and five thousand members. This means 
that they have either successfully eliminated GAM or their 
intelligence was so bad they had no idea of how much 
support the rebels enjoy. This in turn raises questions about 
the extent of pro-Indonesian sentiment in the province. Or 
does it mean - as numerous reports suggest - that many of 
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those killed, arrested or convicted were 
not GAM at all? Whatever the case may 
be, the military's insistence that state-
ments issued by them are indisputably 
true is highly questionable. Which 
brings us back to why the military strat-
egy was chosen. 
The National Human Rights 
Commission (Komnas HAM) in Jakarta 
has frequently confirmed that human 
rights violations have been committed 
by the troops in Aceh, with civilians 
accounting for most of the victims. The 
seventy cases investigated by the 
Commission included arbitrary arrests 
and detentions, torture, forced disap-
pearances, sexual harassment and rape, 
extra judicial executions, indiscrimi-
nate attacks as well as the looting and 
destruction of private property (Jakarta 
Post, 24 May 2004) 
Corruption 
However, Aceh's woes are not limited 
to the horrors of military action. The 
conflict has provided fertile soil for wide-
spread, debilitating corruption. The lives of 
the Acehnese are now at the mercy of 
corrupt civil authorities and hard-line military action. 
Still worse, no one apart from the Acehnese now living in 
Jakarta is asking questions about Aceh, neither politicians, 
social activists nor intellectuals. Apart from protest actions 
by Acehnese, everyone has been busy with the presidential 
elections. The war in Aceh has become a forgotten war, 
internationally and in Indonesia. 
In an election year, when politicians should be called on 
to explain and account for their policies on critical issues 
such as Aceh, very few questions have been asked. No 
politician has provided the necessary vision and strategy for 
a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The two candidates 
who will contest the presidential election in September, 
President Megawati and retired general, Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono, have failed to enunciate policies for resolving 
the conflict in Aceh. 
No one seems concerned about the fate of hundreds of 
Acehnese political prisoners whose treatment violates inter-
national standards of justice. No one seems particularly 
concerned that thousands of Acehnese have been forced to 
join the militias. 
No one has even asked why martial law failed to crush 
GAM. No top level GAM commanders have been captured, 
yet instead of recognising that martial law was a failure, this 
has been cited as a reason for continuing military operations 
inAceh. 
Elections in Aceh 
Campaigning for the general elections in April took place 
under martial law, while the presidential elections were 
conducted after martial law had been replaced by the civil 
emergency. During what should have been a period of elec-
tion campaigning, there was widespread intimidation to 
force people to register as voters. In many places people 
who refused to register were accused of being members or 
sympathisers of GAM. 
ACEH 
Acehnese in rural areas being herded to the polling booths. 
Photo: Aceh Kita 
The journal, Aceh Kita, published many stories about 
Acehnese being forced to register. Those who failed to 
register were visited and terrorised by militia groups. Those 
who failed to tum up on election day were forcibly escorted 
to the polling stations. As a result, the armed forces 
commander-in-chief, General Ryamizard Ryacudu 
triumphantly claimed that 94 per cent of the population 
turned up to vote. This means that the turnout in Aceh was 
higher than in Indonesia as a whole. 
Actually, the mood in Aceh during the parliamentary and 
presidential elections was one of despondence, not only 
because many Acehnese did not want to vote while martial 
law continued but also because few people believed that 
elections would make any difference to the situation on the 
ground. Acehnese sociologist Human Hamid commented 
that the majority of people simply did not believe that any of 
the candidates would bring about changes in the province. 
Groups that were authorised to monitor the elections in 
Indonesia were allowed to send a few representatives to 
Aceh. However, although international organisations 
praised the July elections as a success, international moni-
tors were glaringly remiss in their reporting of the situation 
in Aceh. Most of them failed to comment on the atmosphere 
in Aceh. By simply recording how many people turned up 
and how they behave at the polling stations, they found very 
few incidents. But in a war zone like Aceh, election moni-
toring should consider the atmosphere surrounding the 
process. Strange to say, the EU monitoring team made no 
mention of Aceh in its report. 
Pragmatism 
During the general elections in April as well as in the first 
round of the direct presidential elections in July, the election 
results and the behaviour of the electorate in Aceh was 
strikingly different than in other parts of Indonesia. 
In the April 1999 elections, the Acehnese electorate 
boycotted the elections on a massive scale, with less than a 
continued on page 22 
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2002 -- one month before the Freeport attack, and in 
response to the new US Corporate Fraud Act--Freeport 
drastically cut back these payments, to the military's great 
displeasure. Some officers then made statements suggesting 
that without the military's full protection, the Freeport 
company might be exposed to unwanted, violent attack. 
Second, by staging various provocative actions through-
out West Papua the TNI has been trying to have the whole 
West Papuan movement for justice and self-determination, 
and especially the OPM, designated as a terrorist threat. 
These efforts, including transfer ofLaskar Jihad militants to 
West Papua and recruiting local Papuans into East Timor-
sty le Red and White, militias, as well as pushing for the 
division of West Papua into several new provinces, have 
created conflicts and bloodshed amongst the Papuans. This 
intention by TNI to label the West Papuans as terrorists has 
been very much motivated by the so-called 'war on terror' 
and the desire of TNI to rebuild military ties with the US 
government after the IMET program was suspended follow-
ing the Dilli massacre of 1991. However all these efforts 
have failed so far as the West Papuans have continued to 
struggle vigorously for the declaration of West Papua as a 
zone of peace and for a dialogue with Indonesia to resolve 
the West Papuan issue peacefully. 
Third, two months before the Freeport attack Kelly 
Kwalik, the OPM commander in the southern region, did 
urge his followers to stage demonstrations at the Freeport 
site, but he specified in writing that these protests must be 
nonviolent. The FBI has a copy of Kwalik,s letter, and 
Anthon Wamang confirmed to us that Kelly K walik told 
him that no violence should be employed against persons 
around the Freeport site. Indeed, two weeks before the 
attack a delegation from our organizations met with Kelly 
K walik, and convinced him to withdraw his plan altogether, 
arguing that such an action could easily be manipulated by 
TNI for its own interests. 
Shortly after Attorney General Ashcroft,s announcement 
the TNI leadership publicly stated that US officials had told 
them that the military had now been cleared of involvement 
in the Freeport killings, and that the door was therefore 
open for a resumption of full US military aid to Indonesia. 
It is on public record that the Bush administration has been 
pushing for such aid resumption and has only been 
prevented from doing so by bipartisan opposition in the 
Congress. 
It would be regrettable if a decision on this matter and on 
further adjudication of the Freeport case ends up being 
premised on faulty information from Attorney General 
Ashcroft. 
We call on the US Justice Department and the FBI to now 
correct the omissions in Attorney General Ashcroft's public 
statement by releasing a public accounting of Anthon 
Wamang,s business partnership with the Indonesian mili-
tary and the evidence they have on where he got his ammu-
nition. 
We call on the US Congress, which has already deliber-
ated on this case, to facilitate a full, impartial investigation 
by calling the Justice Department to account. The Congress 
should also call for Anthon Wamang and other key figures 
in the case to be brought safely to the United States. 
We urge the US government to think before it acts on the 
matter of resuming full ties with an Indonesian military that 
has been systematically killing Papuan and other civilians 
with impunity for many years, and that must still, in all fair-
ness, be considered a leading suspect behind the Freeport 
case. . 
We also urge the US government to make representat1?ns 
immediately in Papua and Jakarta to ensure the protect10n 
of members of ELSHAM, LEMASA and YAHAMAK 
against military intimidation, since these organizations have 
cooperated wholeheartedly with the FBI in its Freeport 
. . * mqmry. 
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quarter of the electorate bothering to vote. While 
Indonesians went to the polling booth in droves in that, the 
first free elections after the fall of the dictator Suharto, the 
political situation in Aceh had entered a new stage. 
Acehnese civil society was demanding justice from the 
new political leaders in Jakarta and an end to impunity by 
bringing the gross human rights violators to justice. 
But the reverse happened in 2004, after the military 
authorities had given a clear warning that those failing to 
cast their votes would be labelled as GAM or GAM 
sympathisers. While the Indonesian turnout was above 80 
per cent, the Acehnese broke all records with a turnout of 
94 per cent. This is reminiscent of the Suharto days when 
village and district chiefs were instructed on the size of the 
vote they should secure for the government's party. 
Officials used all kinds of persuasion accompanied by 
intimidation, to drive villagers to the polling booths. 
In 2004, the objective was to secure a huge turnout in 
Aceh though it did not seem to matter which of the parties 
the Acehnese voted for. In any case, there were no 
Acehnese parties on the ballot papers, only the national 
parties permitted to take part in the elections, none of 
which had anything special to offer the Acehnese. * 
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Subandrio, a Sukarno man to the core 
The death in July of Dr Subandrio, aged 89, marks the passing of a leading figure of the 
Sukarno era. He reached the peak of his political career in the closing years of Sukarno's rule, 
but it was his loyalty to Indonesia's first president that led to his downfall after Suharto came 
to power in 1965. In 1966, he was tried and sentenced to death by a kangaroo court acting at 
the behest of the regime. The real target was Sukarno but Suharto did not dare try Sukarno 
whom he had deposed but whose popularity was undiminished, and remained so until 
Sukarno's death in June 1970 
Dr Subandrio was born on 15 September 1914 in 
Kepanjen, East Java and during his school years, he was 
active in a nationalist youth organisation. After graduating 
as a doctor in Jakarta during the Japanese occupation, he 
became the director of a hospital in Semarang, Central Java. 
Following the declaration oflndonesian independence in 
August 1945, Subandrio was drawn into political activity, 
initially in the PSI, the Partai Sosialis Indonesia, which he 
subsequently ditched to join the nationalist party, the PNI. 
Two years later, he went to the UK to strengthen the coun-
try's role on the international arena with the establishment 
of an overseas information office. In 1949, he opened 
Indonesia's first embassy in London and became the ambas-
sador there. After serving as ambassador in London and 
then in Moscow, he returned to Indonesia to become secre-
tary-general of the Ministry of Information. A government 
regulation banning officials from membership of political 
parties led him to quit the PNI. Shortly thereafter he was 
named foreign minister, a post which he held until his arrest 
in 1966. 
Permanent interests 
A shrewd politician, Subandrio was also unashamedly 
opportunistic and held the view that what a man needed to 
have was permanent interests, not permanent friends. 
During the latter years of the Sukarno regime, Dr 
Subandrio was the country's best-known diplomat and a 
foremost proponent of Sukarno's aspiration to spearhead a 
new, actively neutral force in the world, known as the New 
Emerging Forces. Besides holding the post of foreign 
minister, Subandrio was also first deputy prime minister. 
It was under his stewardship of foreign affairs that 
Indonesia entered into confrontation with the Netherlands 
over the fate of West Irian (West Papua) and its confronta-
tion with the British over the creation of Malaysia. At the 
same time, he also accepted a number of positions, in the 
field of intelligence (as head of the Central Bureau of 
Intelligence, the PBI) and in economic affairs. His meteoric 
rise gave him a powerful position under Sukarno seen as his 
most trusted minister. But this was a situation that was to 
have grave consequences for him when Suharto took power. 
His strong advocacy of 'the return oflrian Jaya (as Papua 
was then called) to the fold of the Indonesian Republic' 
placed him in the forefront of an act of injustice towards the 
Papuan people, which was further enhanced under Suharto 
with the fraudulent Act of Free Choice in 1969. 
Handling a grave economic crisis 
During the closing years of the Sukarno era, Indonesia 
suffered a severe economic crisis caused by rampant infla-
tion as the result of the unsustainable printing of money to 
replace the decline in financial resources as the West with-
drew economic aid. This was much in line with Sukarno's 
own policy of rejecting foreign aid. 
While Subandrio had made his mark as a formidable 
diplomat, he lacked the experience to handle the economic 
crisis that engulfed Indonesia. Those were the days of 
Guided Democracy and it was Sukarno's style to create 
'commands' to handle many aspects of state affairs. A 
Special Operations Command for the Economy came into 
being and Subandrio was appointed commander-in-chief, a 
'mission impossible', if there ever was one. At the time, I 
was working in the international economic relations depart-
ment of the Indonesian foreign ministry and was asked to 
head Subandrio's economic affairs office. It was an unenvi-
able assignment and I have little recollection of achieving 
much at a time of deepening crisis, with other ministers 
pursuing their own policies and promoting their own 
projects. When I was dishonourably dismissed from the 
foreign ministry following the crackdown that came in the 
wake of the events of 1 October 1965, Subandrio told me 
frankly that he was powerless to reverse the decision. 
When the 1 October killings occurred, Subandrio was on 
an official mission to North Sumatra. He returned immedi-
ately to Jakarta and was soon involved in efforts to halt the 
massacres that erupted in late October 1965, but to no avail. 
Subandrio's arrest in March 1966 occurred along with the 
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arrest of a dozen other ministers in Sukarno's last cabinet. 
Subandrio was regarded not only as a dedicated Sukarno-ist 
but also as the top-ranking minister most closely associated 
with the leadership of the PKI, the Communist Party, in 
particular its second deputy secretary-general, Njoto. 
Indeed, it was later alleged that his trip to North Sumatra at 
the beginning of October, during which he was accompa-
nied by several ministers, including Njoto, was aimed at 
organising demonstrations in response to the events that 
occurred in Jakarta. 
A show trial 
The widely publicised Subandrio trial (loud-speakers 
relayed the proceedings to crowds outside the courthouse) 
followed soon after the trial of Lieutenant-Colonel Untung, 
the leading plotter of the assassinations on 1 October. The 
trial took place before Mahmilub, the Special Military 
Tribunal set up by Suharto to try the many senior figures 
accused of involvement in the October events. The coun-
try's leading human rights lawyer, Yap Thiam Hien, took on 
the brief as his defence lawyer. Suharto calculated that he 
would better be able to win international approval for his 
seizure of power by putting on trial a number of high-
profile figures, to give his government an appearance of 
legitimacy. While the trials were in progress, hundreds of 
thousands of people were being slaughtered in many parts 
of the country. 
The main charge against Subandrio was subversion. From 
the start, he stood no chance of a fair trial and was denied 
the right to appeal against sentence. Ironically, the subver-
sion law under which he was tried had been enacted by 
Sukarno in 1963 and Subandrio was to suffer the conse-
quences of a law which seriously curtailed the rights of the 
defendant, and required the death sentence or lengthy 
prison terms for anyone found guilty. 
He was convicted of seeking to overthrow the lawful 
government (of which he was a member), which is precisely 
what Suharto had done. There were many specific charges, 
such as for example, arranging for the purchase of weapons 
from China (which he had negotiated during a visit to 
Peking), advising Sukarno to withdraw from the United 
Nations and intriguing with leftwing elements within the 
army leadership to strike against alleged CIA agents at the 
top of the armed forces. 
Like the many hundreds who faced Suharto's kangaroo 
courts, it was also alleged that he knew in advance of the 
October assassination plot but did nothing to prevent it from 
happening. He also faced a number of charges alleging that 
he obstructed the policies of Suharto's 'New Order' regime 
and sought to counter pro-Suharto demonstrations. 
The death sentence was subsequently commuted to life 
imprisonment after a plea for mercy from Queen Elizabeth 
and President Lyndon Johnson. The fact that his death 
sentence was never implemented is certainly due to 
Suharto's fear of unfavourable international repercussions. 
He was eventually released in August 1995, along with 
several other high-profile political prisoners, after spending 
nearly thirty years in prison. 
During his incarceration, he was struck by personal 
tragedy when his only son di~d i~ February ~ 9?4, followed 
soon after by the death of his wife, Hurustlati. He subse-
quently married Sri Kusdyantinah, the widow of a close 
friend, Bambang Supeno. 
Unpublished testimony . . 
While he was in prison, he wrote a book titled Kesaksianku 
Tentang G30S (My Testimony of the G30S). He is believed 
to have argued that Suharto manipulated the coup attempt 
on 1 October 1965 in pursuance of his own interests. For 
reasons that remain unclear, he decided not to go ahead with 
publication of the book. Some believe that he may have 
been warned that the contents would jeopardise his chances 
of ever being released. It remains to be seen whether the 
manuscript is still extant and whether his widow will 
consider that publication is now possible. Two volumes of 
his speeches during the Sukarno era have been published 
under the title, Indonesia on the March. 
During the final years of his life, he lived in obscurity, 
rarely wanting to receive visitors apart from relatives and 
close friends. He honed his skills as a gardener and spent 
much of the time deepening his knowledge of religion. * 
Carmel Budiardjo, London, August 2004 
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